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The Politics of Old and New Social Policies
Silja Häusermann
Introduction
After a decade in which research on the welfare state ﬁrst focused on explain-
ing institutional stability and then progressively started acknowledging a
somewhat surprising amount of change and reform, there is today a certain
consensus with regard to the observation that welfare states are not ‘frozen
landscapes’ as some argued in the 1990s (see e.g. Esping-Andersen 1996: 2).
Instead, welfare states have changed in diverse ways, both cutting back exist-
ing beneﬁts as well as expanding and developing new ones. While the reform
capacity was less of a surprise in the case of liberal and Nordic welfare states
(given both their accent on tax-ﬁnanced, egalitarian and means-tested beneﬁt
on the one hand and the lower number of veto players on the other hand), it is
particularly intriguing to see that even continental welfare states are changing
profoundly1: a range of recent studies evidence systemic reforms in all major
social policy areas (see Häusermann 2010a; Palier 2010; Vail 2009).
However, the literature has not come to a consensus yet, neither with regard
to the forces that are driving this change, nor with its actual direction. With
regard to the driving forces and mechanisms, institutionalist (e.g. Bonoli and
Palier 2007; Palier andMartin 2007), quasi-functionalist (e.g. Hering 2004; Vis
and van Kersbergen 2007) and actor-centred explanations (e.g. Häusermann
2010a; Levy 1999; Vail 2009) co-exist, and with regard to the direction, the
literature has identiﬁed a range of very different reforms. Some studies empha-
size retrenchment of the ‘old’ industrial welfare state, while others stress
changes in the direction of ‘new’ policies, such as activation, social invest-
ment, work-care conciliation or needs-based social security for outsiders.
In this chapter, I will start by arguing that these reforms can be classiﬁed
into ‘new’ vs. ‘old’ social policy instruments, depending on whether they deal
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with and operate within the frontiers of the inherited institutions of income
and job protection, or whether they enact alternative approaches to welfare
provision, namely activation or needs-based social beneﬁts (section 1).
Second, I will develop how these different types of policy instruments can
be combined in a variety of ways that deﬁne speciﬁc directions of welfare
reform: both old and new social policy instruments can be either cut back or
expanded, which implies that welfare reforms can go into a range of different
directions: on the one hand, they can be expansive in all directions (expansion)
or restrictive in all directions (retrenchment). On the other hand, however,
post-industrial welfare reformsmay involve particular packages and ‘mixtures’
of policy instruments: they can, e.g. expand activation and social safety nets at
the expense of income and job protection (ﬂexicurity); they can also re-allocate
spending from generous income protection towards more outsider-oriented
needs-tested beneﬁts (welfare readjustment). Alternatively, however, they can
also preserve and shield old social rights and privileges against outsiders and
new risk groups (welfare protectionism).
After sketching the policy space of current welfare reform in Europe, I will
then explore an actor-centred approach to the politics of new and old social
policies by discussing the conﬂict lines and actor conﬁgurations typical of
post-industrial welfare reform and by discussing the determinants of actor
preferences (section 3). The original ‘new politics literature’ (see e.g. the con-
tributions in Pierson 2001) assumed that actors, i.e. political parties, unions
and employer organizations, will tend to matter less in post-industrial welfare
reform than in the industrial era of welfare state growth, because institutional
dynamics have become predominant. Theoretically, this argument is based on
institutional feedback mechanisms, and empirically, it is closely tied to the
fact that we observe different, ‘unexpected’ actor conﬁgurations for or against
recent reforms, with e.g. left-wing parties supporting retrenchment or certain
employer associations supporting expansion. Building on this literature,
I would like to rephrase this point in a somewhat different way: actors, their
preferences and ideas, may not matter less, but they may matter differently
than in the industrial era, because different issues are at stake. How actors
position themselves with regard to the new social policies increasingly de-
pends on their interests and also the ideational values they defend. Given the
fact that such new issues and new motivations become relevant, it is perfectly
sensible that actor alignments and coalitions have changed accordingly. How-
ever, once we take the multidimensionality of the new welfare policy
space and the realignment of actors into account, it becomes clear that post-
industrial welfare reform relies on variable and highly contingent actor coali-
tions. Hence, there is not one single new actor or actor alliance that drives
welfare reform. Rather, the reconﬁguration of actors can orient policies in
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different directions and it may both enable or prevent reforms, depending on
the overall structure of the policy space.
In the empirical part of this chapter (section 4), I will present three illustra-
tive examples taken from family policy reform in Switzerland and Germany
(as two veto-point dense continental welfare regimes). These case studies are
not intended to provide a conclusive and systematic test of my arguments, but
to illustrate, underline and substantiate threemain points of this chapter: ﬁrst,
old and new social policy reform generate distinctive actor conﬁgurations;
second, the combination of these different reform elements can both enable
and prevent reform-success, whichmakes welfare reform increasingly difﬁcult
to predict; and third, political majorities for ‘narrow’ reforms that deal with
old or new policies exclusively (i.e. without linking them to other issues in a
package deal) rely on fragile and highly contingent actor coalitions.
New vs. Old Social Policy Instruments
The main point of this section is that we can and should distinguish between
‘old’ and ‘new’ social policies. Old social policies refer to those measures
typical for addressing the needs of an industrial society, whereas new social
policies target social risks and demands characteristic of the post-industrial
era. However, it would be wrong to classify entire policy ﬁelds in the categories
of old and new. Rather, we can identify old and new policy instrumentswithin
the main social policy ﬁelds. There is old and new family policy, old and new
labour market policy, old and new pension policy etc. Following the literature
in this ﬁeld and the overall framework of this volume (Armingeon and Bonoli
2006; Bonoli 2005; Bonoli and Natali 2009; Häusermann 2006; Pierson 2001),
I deﬁne old social policies as those which deal with the welfare coverage of the
typical risks of income and job loss that were prevalent in the industrial era.
Income loss by the male breadwinner due to old age, unemployment, sickness
or disability are key in this respect. Old social policies deal with these risks by
means of income protection, i.e. passive transfers and job protection regula-
tion. New social policies, by contrast, are those policies aimed at covering
welfare risks that are typical of the post-industrial society (either because
they are ‘new’, more widespread or newly politicized), such as atypical
employment, long-term unemployment, working poverty, family instability
and lacking opportunities for labour market participation (due to care obliga-
tions or obsolete skills). New social policies can be divided in two groups,
depending on the policy strategy (ex ante vs. ex post) they pursue: a ﬁrst group
of new social policy measures focuses on employability and activation, rather
than passive income replacement. The goal here is to bring recipients back
into gainful employment (ex ante protection). A second group of typically
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new or post-industrial social policies focuses focus on the coverage of new risk
groups (labour market outsiders, single parents, etc.), which were neglected by
the old male breadwinner welfare state and which are unable to secure their
own social protection via employment. The objective of this second type of
policy measures is to provide needs-based social protection which is less
dependent on labour market participation and previous income than the
old, industrial social insurance schemes (ex post). These measures have
become increasingly important, because post-industrial labour markets have
become unable to provide stable employment trajectories, and because indi-
rect protection for outsiders via marriage and family has also become unstable
(what Esping-Andersen 1999 refers to as ‘family and labour market failures’).
In determining which issues should be considered and classiﬁed into the
different groups of new and old social policy instruments, three strands of
welfare literature are important, because they have turned the spotlight on
distinct sets of policy reforms. We need to take into account works on
retrenchment, new social risk policies and social investment/activation poli-
cies. The ‘retrenchment-literature’ (e.g. Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Pierson
2001; see Starke (2006) for a review of this literature) focuses on the conditions
under which and the extent to which existing levels of welfare beneﬁts are
reduced. The basic idea is that the ‘era of austerity’ (Pierson 2001) generates an
overwhelming (quasi-functionalist) need for cutbacks in all realms of social
policy, because existing beneﬁts and privileges have become unsustainable. In
this context, governments are expected to aim at reducing beneﬁt levels and
tightening eligibility criteria in all major policy ﬁelds. Since it deals with the
generosity of existing policy schemes, this literature focuses on the reforms of
old social policies.
In parallel to the retrenchment literature, some studies (Armingeon and
Bonoli 2006; Bonoli 2005) have focused on a quite different challenge to
mature welfare states, namely the rise of new social risks, stemming from
labour market and family failure (Esping-Andersen 1999). Bonoli (2005)
focuses on labour market activation and family policy, but new social risk
policies have appeared in other ﬁelds, such as pensions, too (Häusermann
2010a). They become relevant wherever the income- and employment-related
insurance schemes of the industrial welfare state fail to ensure adequate social
protection, because individuals have become unable to contribute sufﬁciently
to insurance schemes.
Finally, the literature on social investment and activation (Bonoli 2010;
Jenson and Saint-Martin 2006; Lister 2004; Morel et al. 2009,) is empirically
related to the concept of new social risks, but starts from a top-down instead of
a bottom-up angle. Contrary to the new social risk literature, the question is
not what new needs and demands have emerged in the post-industrial society.
Rather, the social investment model conceptualizes a new approach of welfare
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provision, inspired by the idea of welfare as investment in the employability
of risk bearers (i.e. an ex ante prevention of poverty), rather than as compen-
sation of welfare losses (i.e. an ex post coverage of risks and needs). Hence,
social investment policies focus on access to education, training and work.
Table 6.1 provides a—non exhaustive—list of policy instruments, which can
be categorized as corresponding to the different old and new logics of welfare
reforms: income and job protection as typical of the industrial welfare state,
activation and social investment policies, and needs-based social protection. As
outlined above, large parts of the literature have analyzed these reform trends
separately, and tried to identify the distinctive driving forces for each trend. As
I try to argue in the next section, this is a mistake. All three groups of old and
new social policies are raised and politicized in one and the same policy reform
space. Hence, if we want to understand the politics of the post-industrial
welfare state, we need to look at them simultaneously (Häusermann 2010a).
Mapping the Policy Space of Welfare State Reform in Europe
Governments can, of course, attempt to implement either old social policy
reforms or new social policies separately. Part of the literature even argues that
we can explain the adoption of rejection of both types of reformwith the same
Table 6.1. ‘Old’ and ‘new’ social policy instruments
‘Old’ social policies ‘New’ social policies
Income and job
protection policies
Activation/Social
Investment policies
Needs-based social
protection policies
Family policy Family and child
allowances (transfers)
Child and elderly care
services
Subsidized childcare
services for low-
income earners
Parental leave schemes
Labour market/
unemployment
policy
Passive beneﬁts (income
replacement) for
insiders
Active labour market
policies
Needs-based income
support for the (long-
term) unemployed
Employment protection Investment in training
and human capital
formation
Pension policy Income replacement for
insiders
Pension insurance
coverage of outsiders
Pension credits for child
rearing
Universal minimum
pensions
Disability insurance Income replacement
(transfers)
Integration policies
(re-commodiﬁcation)
Social assistance Poverty relief (transfers) Activation and re-
integration programs
Income supplement to
working poor
(negative income tax
etc.)
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 23/5/2012, SPi
The Politics of Old and New Social Policies
115
Comp. by: PG4500 Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0001546849 Date:23/5/12 Time:12:12:24
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001546849.3D116
variables (Armingeon and Bonoli 2006). These studies remain in a rather
linear logic of welfare reform analysis, which tries to identify the factors
driving welfare state change in speciﬁc directions. Both theoretically and
empirically, however, things have become considerably more complex: in
many instances, governments may combine old and new social policies in
reform packages. The literature on political exchange and social pacts (e.g.
Häusermann 2006, 2010b; Levy 1999; Natali and Rhodes 2008; Rhodes 2001)
has argued that these package deals have become a pattern in post-industrial
welfare reform, and as I have shown elsewhere, they have even become a
necessary condition for successful retrenchment in continental pension poli-
tics (Häusermann 2010a). Hence, we need to look at the combined reforms, if
we want to understand the dynamics of post-industrial welfare reform (see
Vail 2009 for a similar argument).
The important point here is that both old and new social policies can be
reformed in either expansive or restrictive ways, even though from very
different starting points. Old social policies start at the ‘mature’ level, which
implies that reforms of social insurance and job protection can either imple-
ment cutbacks or leave these beneﬁts and privileges untouched. New social
policies, by contrast, are typically underdeveloped, precisely because they are
‘new’. Hence, both activation and needs-based social protection may be either
expanded or kept at very low levels (if not cut back). Now governments can
either propose and implement reforms, which go in a similar direction (ex-
panding or restricting the overall level of beneﬁts and rights), or they can
propose packages of measures that go in opposite directions, meaning that
they expand or restrict one type of measures at the expense or to the beneﬁt of
the other. Consequently, we need to take into account all four possibilities of
reform. By combining the two dimensions of old and new social policies, we
arrive at a schematic and aggregated representation of the ‘new’ policy space
of welfare reform in Europe. The direction the reforms in a particular ﬁeld or
country take can be located anywhere in this space, and one can also imagine
that reforms in different ﬁelds go in different directions. But identifying these
four possibilities of welfare reformmay be useful to identify patterns as well as
cross-sectional and cross-national differences.
The two ﬁelds of expansion and retrenchment are obviously straightfor-
ward, but probably less likely and less analytically interesting. Expansion could
historically be observed mostly in the era of welfare state growth in countries
that expanded early in new social risk coverage (such as the Nordic countries,
Bonoli 2007). In the 1960s and early 1970s, the overall direction of welfare
reform was expansive in all respects. Today, the reforms taking place most
plausibly in this quadrant would probably preserve existing levels of welfare,
while at the same time expanding additional measures and beneﬁts for new
risk groups. Retrenchment, by contrast, can be identiﬁed when governments
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cut back on existing rights without compensating the losers of the reforms
and without reallocating the savings to new social needs and policies. For-
merly privileged groups lose their beneﬁts and new risk groups do not see their
coverage improved. This is precisely the type of reform Pierson probably had
in mind when he argued that retrenchment was very unlikely to be imple-
mented in democratic polities, since it involved no credit-claiming at all and
entails—at least among welfare beneﬁciaries—reform losers only. We can also
relate Streeck’s (2009) concept of ‘liberalization’ to this quadrant: job and
income protection are being eroded for the core workforce, which eventually
makes all workers rely on minimum poverty protection only, similar to the
well-known pattern in liberal countries.
The two remaining quadrants—ﬂexicurity/welfare readjustment and wel-
fare protectionism—involve trade-offs: in the case of ﬂexicurity and welfare
readjustment, governments cut back on existing levels of old beneﬁts, while
at the same time expanding new social policies. Flexicurity denotes a strategy
of liberalizing and deregulating job protection, while in turn providing more
adequate support for job seekers (through activation) and the unemployed
(through generous income support). Welfare readjustment, by contrast, is less
tightly linked to job protection: it denotes the idea that old privileges of the
core workforce in terms of income security are somewhat restrained to the
beneﬁt of new risk groups, which are unable to meet the tight eligibility
criteria of the social insurance welfare state. Thereby, welfare readjustment
comes very close to what Levy (1999) had in mind when he described some
reforms in terms of turning ‘vice into virtue’: welfare reforms that cut back on
generous beneﬁt levels to reallocate spending to more acute and uncovered
Retrenchment
Retrenchment of
“old” policies:
income and
job protection
Flexicurity /
Welfare readjustment
Welfare
protectionism
Expansion
Retrenchment of “new” policies:
activation / needs-based social protection
Expansion of “new” policies:
activation / needs-based social protection
Expansion of
“old” policies:
income and
job protection
Figure 6.1. Mapping the ‘new’ policy space of welfare reform in Europe
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social needs. Finally, welfare protectionism denotes reforms that shield the
privileges of old beneﬁciaries against the claims, needs and demands of new
risk groups. Eligibility is tightened in the main social insurance schemes at the
expense of growing groups of outsiders who have no access to decent social
protection.
Welfare readjustment and welfare protectionism can also be linked to the
growing literature on increasingly dualized welfare states. The concept of
dualized welfare (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004; Emmenegger et al. 2012;
Palier and Thelen 2010) means that post-industrial welfare states move in
the direction of two distinct sorts of welfare beneﬁts: the old schemes of
earnings- and work-related social insurance are largely maintained for the
core workforce, i.e. the insiders, while reforms introduce a different type of
welfare state for the marginally, atypically and unemployed, i.e. the outsiders
(based on tax-ﬁnanced and needs-based beneﬁts and new social risk policies
more generally). Thereby, the distinction between welfare readjustment and
welfare protectionism helps distinguishing the two ways in which the term
‘dualization’ is being used: some authors use it to denote that increasing
numbers of outsiders are ejected from the ‘real’ and ‘good’ social protection
into a secondary, residual and more fragile kind of welfare (see Clegg 2007;
Palier and Thelen 2010). Others, however, use the word in a less pejorative
way, meaning that welfare states re-balance the insider-focus of their social
insurance schemes towards a second type of welfare provision that is more
adequate and adapted to the needs and work biographies of outsiders (see to
some extent Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004; Häusermann 2010a; Levy 1999).
The introduction of needs-based social protection via pension minima or
more generous social assistance levels (think, e.g., of the RSA in France) goes
in this direction. While welfare protectionism refers to the ﬁrst type of duali-
zation, welfare readjustment is linked to the second type. The result is struc-
turally similar: two types of welfare provision instead of the formerly coherent
social insurance state. The distributional implications, however, are very dif-
ferent: In the case of welfare readjustment, outsiders gain increased protection
while insiders lose some of their privileges. In the case of welfare protection-
ism, outsiders lose at the expense of an (ever shrinking) proportion of insiders.
The Location and Conﬁgurations of Actors in the Policy Space
If political parties, trade unions and employer organizations aligned iden-
tically on income protection-, activation-, and needs-based social protection
reforms, the distinction of these three groups of old and new policy instru-
ments would not matter for the analysis of welfare politics, i.e. actors, interests
and alliances. However, they do not. A whole range of studies have evidenced
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new and atypical reform coalitions when it comes to new social policies, with
e.g. employers supporting activation and family policy expansion (Ballestri
and Bonoli 2003; Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004; Daguerre 2006), left-wing
parties cutting back existing beneﬁt levels (Kitschelt 2001; Ross 2000) or
increasing heterogeneity among trade unions with regard to pension reform
(Häusermann 2010b). I argue here that these coalitions stop being unexpected
or surprising once we take into account the multidimensionality of post-
industrial reform politics. Political parties, trade unions and employer organi-
zations align differently on the three dimensions illustrated in table 6.1,
depending on the interests and values they represent. Hence, if we want to
understand why an actor advocates or opposes a particular reform, we need to
look at the material interests and the values of this actor’s constituency.
Figure 6.2 presents schematic hypotheses on the idea-typical location of the
main political forces with regard to the three dimensions of policy reform. The
important message in ﬁgure 6.2 is that the alignment of actors is very likely to
be different across these dimensions. In the following, I brieﬂy explain why.
With regard to income and job protection, the policies typical of the indus-
trial era welfare state, we would expect employers and market-liberal political
parties to advocate retrenchment, because they increase the cost of labour and
account for the bulk of social spending in the mature welfare state. At the
opposite end of the conﬂict line, we would expect the industrial ‘working
class’—i.e. blue-collar insider workers—to advocate expansion/maintenance
of beneﬁt levels, because the social insurance welfare state was built precisely
for these workers. The old working class is the main constituency of the ‘old’,
workerist left, which is why we might expect the major trade unions and old
left parties to defend their material interests. In between employers and the
old left, the new left—defending women’s, outsiders and the new middle
Expansion of
income and
job protection
Retrenchment of
income and
job protection
Retrenchment of
needs-based
social security
Retrenchment of
activation policies
Old
 lef
t
Old
 lef
t
Old
 lef
t
Ne
w l
eft
Ne
w l
eft
Ne
w l
eft
Co
nse
rva
tive
s
Lib
era
ls /
Em
plo
yer
s
Lib
era
ls /
Em
plo
yer
s
Lib
era
ls /
Em
plo
yer
s
Co
nse
rva
tive
s
Co
nse
rva
tive
s
Expansion of
activation policies
Expansion of
needs-based
social security
Figure 6.2. Hypotheses on ideal-typical actor positions with regard to ‘old’ and ‘new’
social policies
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classes’ interests (Kitschelt 1994)—should support old welfare policies, but less
clearly so than the old left, since the new left’s constituencies are not themain
beneﬁciaries of the old welfare state. Finally, the conservatives—mainly Chris-
tian Democrats—should be more sceptical against state intervention in gen-
eral, but they traditionally have a left-wing, interventionist part of their
electorate which makes them more open for social insurance than employers
and market-liberal parties (van Kersbergen 1995).
The new left’s voters, including many outsiders—i.e. those members of the
workforce particularly affected by atypical employment and unemployment
(Häusermann and Schwander 2009), as well as new risk groups more generally
(mostly young and female risk bearers, Bonoli 2005)—have lower stakes in
these old social insurance schemes than insiders, because they do not have full
contribution records anyway. By contrast, outsiders and new risk groups have
a very strong interest in the development of new social policies (both activa-
tion and needs-based social security), in contrast to insiders. Hence, the new
left is expected to be the strongest supporter of the new social policies. The
difference between activation and needs-based social protection is to be found
on the right, rather than on the left: employers may favour activation, because
activation and social investment reforms are oriented towards a commodiﬁca-
tion of the workforce. They may even have more favourable stances on
activation than the old left who traditionally was the main opponent of
commodiﬁcation. Conservative forces, by contrast, may see activation and
social investment (including notably the commodiﬁcation of women and
early schooling for children) as a threat the traditional family and gender
roles,2 which may increase their scepticism against such policies. Things are
different with needs-based social security measures for labour market out-
siders. Again, we expect the new left to be the main advocate of these mea-
sures, because they beneﬁt most directly to their electorate and members.3
Market-liberal parties and employers, by contrast, may have less of an interest
in these—clearly redistributive and de-commodifying—policies than in acti-
vation, which is why I would expect them to oppose such reforms most
clearly. Given the proﬁles of their electorates, we would expect the old left
and conservative parties between these two poles. The old left supports
redistribution, but privileges social insurance and job protection, and the
conservatives may tend to refrain from the more equalizing and non-stratify-
ing character of these policies.
Figure 6.2 shows that the reform of the post-industrial welfare state can go
in very different directions, which divide the relevant actors in distinct ways.
This divergence of actor alignments holds a clear potential of varying coali-
tions ad alliances of actors driving such reforms. It also evidences why reform
packages are so important. Indeed, governments can combine different
reform elements, thereby facilitating political exchange and actor coalitions.
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Liberals alone, e.g. may not have a sufﬁcient majority to implement retrench-
ment, their main priority, just as the new left alone cannot achieve activation
and more needs-based social security, and the old left alone fails in ‘saving’
welfare protection. Each of them, however, can ﬁnd allies if a reform package
includes more than one type of measure, i.e. if it makes concessions and side-
payments along other reform dimensions. I illustrate this logic in ﬁgure 6.3,
which shows a hypothetical policy space identical to the one shown in
ﬁgure 6.1. If governments combine new and old policy instruments, they
may create potentials for actor coalitions.
The ellipses in ﬁgure 6.3 represent the approximative location of the different
political forces in the policy space. While the left is split and/or oscillating—
depending on the country—between their support for old and new social
policies, conservatives clearly oppose the ‘new’ policies, while they have a
rather wide margin with regard to the old welfare state. Employers and mar-
ket-liberal parties, by contrast, may side with the new left when it comes to
activation policies, or with the conservatives when it comes to enacting
retrenchment or preventing needs-based social protection. The precise condi-
tions and dynamics of coalition-formation in different policy ﬁelds and
countries are beyond the aim and scope of this chapter, and their analysis
would require that we integrate institutional and strategic variables to this
model (Häusermann 2010a). The point I would like to emphasize here is that
New left
Old left
Liberals
Employers (for
activation)
Conservatives
Retrenchment of “new” policies:
activation / needs-based social protection
Expansion of “new” policies:
activation / needs-based social protection
Retrenchment of
“old” policies:
income and
job protection
Expansion of
“old” policies:
income and
job protection
Figure 6.3. Ideal-typical actor positions in themultidimensional policy space of welfare
reform in Europe
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the actor conﬁgurations in the new policy space of the European welfare state
are characterized by complex multidimensionality, which makes the result of
reform processes highly contingent. Looking at the power resources of e.g. the
old left or of capital is insufﬁcient to evaluate the chances of reforms in a
particular direction. Alliances depend strongly on the issues that are on the
table, on the dimensionality of the policy space and on the positions and power
balances of all actors in a policy subsystem. The three case studies I will brieﬂy
present in the empirical part of this chapter demonstrate this contingency of
the new politics of the welfare state.
Reforming Family Policy: the Contingency of Actor
Conﬁgurations and Reform Success
This section presents three illustrative examples of reforms taken from family
policy reform in Switzerland and Germany (as two veto-point dense continen-
tal welfare regimes). These short case studies illustrate, underline and substan-
tiate three main points of this chapter: (1) welfare states can be reformed,
because complex package deals of different reform dimensions allow for suc-
cessful reform coalitions. (2) The complexity of coalition formation in multi-
dimensional policy spaces, however, makes reform outcomes highly unstable
and difﬁcult to predict, since they can both assemble and divide reform
supporters. And (3), political majorities for ‘narrow’ reforms that deal with a
single dimension of reform exclusively (i.e. without linking it to other issues
in a package deal) rely on fragile and highly contingent actor coalitions.
The choice of family policy for illustrating these reform dynamics results
from the fact that other ﬁelds, such as labour market or pension policy have
been widely researched over the past decade. Recent studies have emphasized
the importance of package deals, trade-offs and issue-linkage in reforming
unemployment policies towards more narrow insider protection and new
forms of poverty relief for the (long-term) unemployed (see e.g. Clegg 2012;
Palier and Thelen 2010; Vail 2009). Similarly, it has been shown that pension
modernization in many European countries relied on complex dynamics of
political exchange and compensation between advocates of pension cutbacks
and new trends of expanding speciﬁc aspects and new ‘pillars’ of pension
reform (see e.g. Bonoli 2000; Häusermann 2010a; Natali and Rhodes 2008;
Schludi 2005; Vail 2009).
Family policy is considered to be a typical ﬁeld of ‘new’ welfare policies,
both with regard to new social risk-policies and with regard to social invest-
ment and activation. The saliency of family policy reform is particularly high
in continental Europe, where all countries—except France—have been relying
on the ‘old’ male breadwinner model of family policy (mainly based on child
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beneﬁts, i.e. ﬁnancial transfers) way into the 1990s. With increasing societal
modernization and secularization on the one hand (weakening the Christian
Democratic imprint of continental family policy), and structural pressure
towards the commodiﬁcation of women on the other hand (in particular the
EU Lisbon agenda, as well as a need to boost employment ratios in continental
Europe (Iversen andWren 1998)), however, claims for a more interventionist,
individualized and work-care related family policy have generally become
stronger (e.g. Jenson and Sineau 2001; Morgan 2009). At the same time, new
poverty risks and declining earnings power of families put (or keep) family
policy as a means of poverty alleviation on the agenda. Hence, both old and
new policy instruments are at stake.
The ﬁrst example discussed here shows how the interplay of different
reform dimensions enabled family policy modernization in Germany,
through a reform of the federal law on educational beneﬁts in 2000 by the
red-green coalition government (see also Leitner et al. 2004). The reform
included ﬁve main elements, two of which could be subsumed under the
heading of ‘old’ measures of job and income protection (the expansion of
educational beneﬁts and the strengthening of parent’s rights at the workplace)
and three under the heading of a ‘new’ logic of activation. The ﬁrst two
elements can be considered expanding on ‘old policies’, because they increase
transfers and strengthenworkers rights to withdraw (partially) from the labour
market. At the same time, however, the bill proposed to introduce incentives
for parents to shorten their parental leave to 6 months instead of a full year, to
encourage them to take up part-time work early during their parental leave
and to combine work and care. For the purpose of this empirical analysis,
I have coded actor positions on all reform issues, in order to locate actors in the
policy space formed by these two types of measures. I will not go into the
details of measurement and methods here, because the aim is only to sketch
the policy space in relation to the theoretical expectations developed in the
theoretical sections above (more details are given in the appendix). Figure 6.4
shows the positioning of actors in the two-dimensional policy space.
Trade unions, family organizations and the Green party strongly advocated
the expansion of beneﬁts and workers rights (horizontal dimension), while
the employers’ organizations and the all three other parties (SPD, FDP, CDU/
CSU) were more reluctant with regard to this orientation of reform4. On the
vertical axis, things look, however, very different: trade unions, employer
organizations, the market-liberal FDP, the Social Democrats SPD and the
Greens all clearly advocated activation, against the more conservative posi-
tions of the Christian Democrats CDU/CSU and family associations. Thus in
this reform, the red-green government developed a ‘welfare expansion’ pack-
age that contained elements, which could appeal to advocates of both the
traditional model of family policy and a more activation-oriented model of
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work-care conciliation. In that sense, this reform can be seen as a typical
example of successful new politics of welfare reform.
When welfare reforms involve some sort of retrenchment, a compensation
to part of the losers of the reform has turned out to be necessary to allow for
policy change (Häusermann 2010a). When it comes to purely expansive re-
forms, however, they may also rely on a single reform dimension. This strat-
egy, however, is very fragile and contingent, as the second example shows,
taken from the Swiss 2003 reform of public subsidies for childcare
infrastructure.
Family policy in Switzerland works quite differently fromGermany. Indeed,
the traditional male breadwinner family policy is not only very limited in
scope, and it is also a ‘victim’ of federalist fragmentation (Bonoli and Häuser-
mann 2011). The level of child beneﬁts lies in the competence of cantons and
the responsibility for work-care infrastructure is shared between the local,
cantonal and federal levels. This implies that issue-linkage and package build-
ing are more constrained than in the German case: the national government
has only very limited leverage over ‘old’ transfers in exchange for new policies.
The case of the introduction of public subsidies for childcare facilities illus-
trates a reform under these constraints (see also Ballestri and Bonoli 2003 on
this reform). The bill proposed that the federal government grants subsidies
for newly founded childcare facilities, in order to improve the very poor
coverage of childcare infrastructure in Switzerland. This is a typical ‘new’
German Family
Union
Green Party
Peak union DGB
White-collar
union DAG
Social
Democrats
SPD
Market-liberal
party FDP
Union of
employers
BDA
Small Business
Employers ZdH
Christian Democrats
CDU/CSU
CONTRA activation
CONTRA Income
and job protection
PRO Income and
job protection
PRO activation
Figure 6.4. Actor conﬁguration in the reform of the German law on educational ben-
eﬁts 2000
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policy reform, which appeals to political actors who represent (working)
women and who advocate progressive values of gender equality, as well as to
actors with an interest in activation and the commodiﬁcation of women.
Hence, the reform gave rise to an alignment of actors (Figure 6.5, for data,
see again the appendix), which included the parties of the new left, trade
unions, as well as certain employer organizations and liberal parties among
the supporters, against the conservative Swiss People’s party and small busi-
ness employers on the side of the opponents.
The bill was eventually accepted in parliament, but only with the tenuous
support of the employers and the market-liberal party FDP. Yet, the uni-
dimensionality of this policy makes this winning coalition fragile. While in
Germany, the government has the capacity to bolster ‘modernizing’ new
policy reforms with some side-payments to the more conservative actors,
the Swiss government has a much harder time to do so. Hence, as soon as
the support of the employers towards care infrastructure weakens (e.g. in the
wake of a recession), the support coalition vanishes. The upshot of this is that
the diversiﬁcation of the welfare agenda has led to heterogeneous reform
coalitions, which are fragile and variable, because they do not rely on long-
standing, traditional alliances (Häusermann and Kübler 2011).
The third example illustrates a ﬁnal aspect of the ‘new’ politics of welfare
reform, i.e. the risk of multidimensionality actually dividing the underlying
coalition of a policy. In the German 2000 reform of educational beneﬁts,
multidimensionality contributed to assembling a successful coalition. Assem-
bling different dimensions in a reform process, however, not necessarily
guarantees successful reform outcomes. Indeed, raising a series of reform
dimensions can also split the potential advocates of policy change. The
Swiss decision-making process on means-tested child allowances provides an
example of this dynamic. Already in the early 1990s, left-wing parliamentar-
ians started a law proposal aiming at the introduction of means-tested supple-
mentary child allowances, in particular for single mothers or low-income
families. Indeed, general child allowances are granted universally, irrespective
of the income of families. This proposal was thus a response to growing
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Party FDP
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Employers SGV
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Figure 6.5. Actor conﬁguration in the Swiss law on public subsidies for child care
facilities
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concerns about children being a source of poverty, especially for single
mothers. The proposal, however, included also a second element, aimed at
activation. In order to increase incentives for labour market participation even
for low-income parents, the law would have provided tax cuts for low-income
families combining work and external childcare. The parliamentarians behind
the proposal were hoping to raise a broader support base for the reform with
this combination of measures (Häusermann 2006). The decision-making pro-
cess, however, was blocked repeatedly, because the market-liberal party FDP
was too reluctant to support needs-based social protection as an activation
tool.
As ﬁgure 6.6 shows that the left-wing parties, trade unions and Christian
Democrats mostly supported the bill. The protestant party was inclined to
support increased transfer to poor families, but was more reluctant towards
work-care conciliation, as was the conservative women’s association. On the
other hand, the FDP supported activation, but not the increase in ﬁnancial
transfers. Eventually, the speciﬁc reservations of each camp prevented
the formation of a sufﬁcient coalition for support, which created a reform
deadlock.
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Social Democratic
Party
Protestant
Party
Conservative women’s
Association
Market-liberal
Party FDP
Union of
Employers’
Organization SAV
Small Firms
Employers SGV
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Trade Union CNG
Figure 6.6. Actor conﬁguration on the Swiss law proposal on means-tested child
allowances
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Conclusion
The main point I intend this chapter to make is that reforms of the ‘new
welfare state in Europe’ can go in several distinct, but interrelated directions.
Not only can they be divided into three logics of welfare reform—an
‘old’ policy logic based on transfers, passive income replacement and de-
commodiﬁcation, and two ‘new’ logics based on activation/social invest-
ment and needs-based social security—but moreover, these logics can be
combined in various ways. Therefore, welfare reforms, and the development
of the ‘new welfare state’ more generally may be classiﬁed with respect to at
least four models or directions of change: expansion, i.e. the introduction of
new social policies and the preservation or expansion of old ones, retrench-
ment, i.e. cutbacks in old policies and a lacking development of new policies,
ﬂexicurity and welfare readjustment, i.e. the development of new policies
instead of and at the expense of old policies of job and income support
and, ﬁnally, welfare protectionism, i.e. the preservation of the old welfare
rights for a shrinking proportion of insiders at the expense of largely unpro-
tected and marginalized outsiders. The distinction of these three dimensions
and four models may be useful for the analysis, measurement and compari-
son of actual policy change, but even more so, it is important to understand
the politics of the new welfare state.
Indeed, the distinction of the three dimensions of post-industrial welfare
reform matters, because actors align differently with regard to them. Old
policies tend to oppose the representatives of labour market insiders (the
‘old left’ and trade unions) to employers and the right, while new policies
are in the interest of outsiders and the new middle classes (and their repre-
sentatives, i.e. the ‘new left’) as well as—when it comes to activation—
employers and market-liberal actors. This is the reason why—in addition to
the traditional distributional class conﬂict—insider/outsider divides and value
divides become key for the understanding of the new welfare state politics.
With three case studies of family policy reforms, I have tried to show empiri-
cally that we cannot understand either the politics or the policies of the new
welfare state unless we take into account the multidimensionality of the
reform space and the ensuing contingency of reform coalitions.
A further implication of the multidimensionality of post-industrial reform
politics is that outputs and outcomes—i.e. the actual substance of reforms—
have become difﬁcult to predict. Equilibria in a multidimensional space are
per deﬁnition difﬁcult to predict. A government, which actually favours a
welfare expansion model, may join a coalition with either supporters of the
welfare protectionist model or of the welfare readjustment model—the distri-
butional outcome of which will obviously be very different. Hence, small
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coalitional realignments may have strong consequences for reform outputs.
Therefore, the welfare state literature—15 years after the ‘new politics’-turn—
has two important tasks on its agenda: it must evaluate and measure the
direction and extent of policy change in a comparable way, and it must
theorize the dynamics that lead to one or the other outcome. Welfare reform
outputs cannot be explained in simple linear models anymore. X leads to
‘more’ and Y to ‘less’ welfare have become inadequate hypotheses, because
‘more’ and ‘less’ refer to multiple dimensions, and X and Ymust be combined.
Hence, we need conﬁgurational theories of welfare development, which
explain the patterns of alliances governments enter. These alliances depend
on strategies, the institutional context and the ‘political supply’ (i.e. the
country-speciﬁc actor conﬁguration). All three factors can and should be
theorized, in order to develop an understanding of the policies and politics
of the new welfare state.
Appendix
Data and methods
In analyzing actor conﬁgurations, I coded the position of each actor on every reform
element on a scale ranging from 0 to 2. 1 means that the actor supports the govern-
mental bill proposal, 0 means that the actor favours more generous and encompassing
coverage and 2 means that the actor favours less generous coverage. I coded the
positions of each actor on four aspects of each reform element:
1) intervention: whether state intervention is required to resolve the problem or not;5
2) scope: who should be covered by the social policy measure;6
3) level: which level of beneﬁts should be adopted;7 and
4) competence: at what state level the intervention should take place.8
I used the average of the four positions in the subsequent empirical analyses, to locate
actors in the policy space.
The coding relies on the following data sources: For Switzerland: the responses and
ofﬁcial statements of political actors to the ofﬁcial pre-parliamentary consultation
procedure (‘Vernehmlassungsverfahren’), bill proposals and parliamentary debates, as
well as press documents for the ﬁnal positions. For Germany: the minutes of the
meetings, and the ofﬁcial statements of actors in the public parliamentary hearings
(‘Anhörungen’) and the positions of party groups in the parliamentary debates, as well
as press documents and secondary literature.
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Notes
1. The reform-capacity of continental Europe’s social insurance-welfare states is
surprising for a number of reasons: ﬁrst, their institutional setup is supposed to
prevent cutbacks because contribution-ﬁnancing and earnings-related beneﬁts cre-
ate institutional feedbacks (Pierson 2001). Second, continental welfare states are
insider-oriented male breadwinner systems, which tend to neglect new social risks
(Armingeon and Bonoli 2006). And third, both retrenchment and new social risk
pressures arise in a time of austerity supposed to sharpen conﬂict and increase
polarization (Häusermann 2010a).
2. The value-dimension is important on the side of advocates of these policies, too:
new social policies (both activation and needs-based support) are not only
structured in a less stratifying and more egalitarian way, they also question the
male breadwinner model by bringing more women into work and covering their
social risks independently from the family. This is why progressives—the new left
representing the new middle classes—agree with them.
3. The conceptualization and precise patterns of representation of electoral constitu-
encies in relation to changing social structure is an empirical question that cannot
be analyzed thoroughly in the scope of this chapter (see to this end e.g. Häusermann
2008; Häusermann 2010a; Kitschelt and Rehm 2005; Kriesi et al. 2008; Oesch 2006).
In addition, it is important to note that the actual parties and trade unions behind
the labels of ‘new and old left’, ‘conservatives’ and ‘liberals’ vary between countries.
Social Democratic parties, for instance, have kept a more old left proﬁle in some
countries, whereas they have shifted to the ‘new left’ in others (see e.g. Kriesi et al.
2008). These are empirical questions analysts of welfare reform have to take into
account.
4. The position of the SPD is particularly intriguing here. Under the leadership of the
Social Democratic family minister, the SPD was keen on reorienting family policy
away from the male breadwinner model towards activation and work-care concilia-
tion, which may explain its reluctant position on the old policy expansion.
5. 0 meaning that the actor favours more modest state intervention than the govern-
ment bill proposes and 2 meaning that the actor wants a faster or more far-reaching
reform.
6. 0 meaning that the circle of beneﬁciaries should be smaller than is proposed by the
government and 2 meaning that the reform should beneﬁt more people (and vice
versa in case of retrenchment).
7. 0 meaning that the actor wants lower beneﬁts than the government proposes and
2 meaning that the actor votes for higher beneﬁts.
8. 0 meaning that the actor favours a more subsidiary approach than the government
proposes (e.g. a reform at substate-, sector- or ﬁrm-level) and 2 meaning that the
actor favours a more homogenous and centralized policy.
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